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appeared that DuPont Merck
silently withdrew, the court found it
was not free from the ramifications
of the alleged conspiracy. Therefore,
the court reversed the district court
and held that DuPont Merck had
been improperly dismissed.
In conclusion, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the four rulings of
the district court, which Plaintiffs
appealed from by holding that: (1)
indirect purchasers were barred
from filing suit against
manufacturers under federal law;
(2) the class action suit filed
pursuant to Alabama antitrust law
should have been remanded to state
court; (3) the wholesalers were
improperly dropped as defendants;
and (4) DuPont Merck was
improperly dismissed as a
defendant.
California Judicial Candidate Requirements Did Not
Violate the U.S. Constitution
By Sara Marzullo
In NAACP v. Jones, 131 F.3d
1317 (9th Cir. 1997), the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that Los Angeles
County's (the "County")
reimbursement system (the
"system"), which requires judicial
candidates to reimburse the County
for printing their candidate
statements in the Official Sample
Ballot and Voter Information
Booklet and which does not provide
public funding for campaigns, does
not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or any fundamental
right under the First Amendment.
Each judicial candidate may
print a 200-word statement in the
Official Sample Ballot which is
circulated to every voter in the
County that describes his or her
background and position on the
issues. Under a practice known as
the "cost-reimbursement
requirement," however, all judicial
candidates may be required to
reimburse the County for the
printing costs of their statements in
the Official Sample Ballot and Voter
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Information Booklet. By statute, the
County Board of Supervisors can
decide each campaign year whether
judicial candidates will have to
reimburse the County for the costs
of printing. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §
13307 (West 1997). When the
Supervisors require these cost-
reimbursement payments, these
payments do not fund elections, and
the County may not retain them.
In response to the cost-
reimbursement requirement, the
NAACP, Charles Lindner (a former
candidate), and voters of the County
("Plaintiffs") brought suit against
the Secretary of State of California,
Bill Jones, and other County
officials ("Defendants"). Plaintiffs
alleged that the County's campaign
rules created a "wealth primary"
forcing candidates to spend a
significant amount of money to run
a meaningful campaign.
Plaintiffs argued that the "wealth
primary" violated the First
Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and they sought
declaratory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs contended that the County
should print every candidate's
statement free of charge and create
a public fund for potential
candidates that would allow them to
run meaningful campaigns.
The district court dismissed
Plaintiffs' claims against Secretary
of State Jones pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to plead
with specificity. In particular,
Plaintiffs failed to plead specific
incidents showing Jones violated
their rights. In addition, the district
court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims
against the other Defendants for
lack of standing because they failed
to allege an "injury in fact."
Plaintiffs also brought state law
claims but did not appeal them.
No "Heightened Scrutiny"
Applied
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first
determined whether it should
analyze Plaintiff's equal protection
claim by using a "heightened
scrutiny analysis." Courts apply a
Volume 10, number 2
Recent Cases
"heightened scrutiny analysis" only
when a practice burdens a suspect
class or a fundamental right. If
heightened scrutiny does not apply,
the County's actions need only be
"rationally related" to a state
purpose. Wealth is not a suspect
category that receives heightened
scrutiny. Race is a suspect category,
but the Ninth Circuit stated that if
Plaintiffs wished to bring an equal
protection claim alleging a
disparate effect on racial categories,
they would have had to allege
discriminatory intent. Plaintiffs in
this case did not allege such intent.
The court, therefore, decided the
case based solely on the issue of
wealth, rather than race, and held
that the County judicial election
process did not restrict a suspect
class. The court then proceeded to
determine whether the County
election process restricted
fundamental rights.
Fundamental First
Amendment Rights Not
Restricted
Plaintiffs claimed that the system
violated their fundamental First
Amendment rights by restricting
their access to candidates'
viewpoints. The court referred to its
prior decision in Kaplan v. Los
Angeles, 894 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.
1990), which held that "[a] forum
created by the government to allow
a limited class of speakers to
address a particular class of
topics... is a limited public forum
.... [and] content neutral
restrictions [should] serve a
significant state interest, in a
narrowly tailored fashion and leave
open ample alternative channels of
communication." Id. at 1080.
In Kaplan, the Ninth Circuit
held that as long as a
reimbursement process did not
inhibit a candidate's ability to get
on the ballot, or adversely affect his
or her ability to communicate views
by other means, it did not violate
the First Amendment for a county to
require reimbursement of the
charges that the County would incur
for costs relating to the distribution
information. See id. at 1081.
Because the County's system did not
violate any of the provisions set
forth in Kaplan, the court held that
Plaintiff Lindner did not have a
First Amendment right to have his
statement printed free of charge.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
held that voters did not have a First
Amendment right to receive the
candidate information as it would
be included in the candidate's
statement in the Official Ballot.
Although the First Amendment
protects the rights of both speakers
and listeners, no authority exists for
the proposition that the listener's
rights outweigh the speaker's.
Therefore, although Kaplan did not
specifically address the question of
listener's rights, the court found the
case applicable because if Plaintiff
Lindner did not have a fundamental
right to publish his statement for
free, the voters did not subsequently
have a derivative right to receive it.
The court also held that the
voters did not have a fundamental
right to receive a state-funded
campaign speech. The First
Amendment rights of voters extend
only to the right to assemble and
associate "for the advancement of
political beliefs," and "to cast their
votes effectively." By asserting that
they had a right to publicly funded
campaigns, Plaintiffs requested that
the court extend First Amendment
rights beyond boundaries supported
by any precedent, and the court
refused to do so.
Finally, the court held that the
voter Plaintiffs' claim that the
system caused "viewpoint
discrimination" because the County
required all or none of the
candidates to pay for publishing
their statements was without merit.
Additionally, Plaintiffs failed to
allege discriminatory intent.
Therefore, the court found that the
"wealth primary" did not violate a
fundamental right under the First
Amendment.
No Fundamental Right
Exists in Electing Candidates
of Choice
Relying on Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944), Plaintiffs also
claimed that "voters have a
fundamental right to contribute
effectively to a candidate's
campaign." In Smith, the Court held
that excluding African-Americans
from a Democratic primary was
unconstitutional on two separate
grounds. First, the Court found that
a Texas law excluding African-
Americans from the primary
effectively excluded them from
voting in the general election, a
right to which they were entitled.
In the present case, the court
found such facts distinguishable.
Plaintiffs argued that because
candidates bear the cost of having
their statements printed, which
Plaintiffs claimed was a "necessary
part of the election process," they
were thereby excluded from
contributing to the success of
campaigns because of their lack of
wealth. However, the court
explained that in Smith, African-
Americans were excluded from a
portion of the electoral process,
while in the present case there was
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"no state action putting wealthy
voters in a better position to
contribute to campaigns than non-
wealthy voters." Additionally, in
Smith, African-Americans were
denied the right to vote, and the
Plaintiffs in this case made no such
claim. The court refused to
recognize the right to run a
financially successful campaign,
which it concluded was not
comparable to the right vote.
Additionally, the court noted that no
voters' rights cases supported
Plaintiffs' argument because
Plaintiffs did not allege that they
had lost their right to vote. Instead,
Plaintiffs merely alleged that their
ability to influence others prior to
voting was diminished by their lack
of wealth. The court held that there
is no fundamental right for every
voter to have the "same access to
the campaigning process."
No Fundamental Right to
Run for Office
The court next held that the
system did not violate Plaintiff
Lindner's fundamental rights as a
candidate. The system neither
violated his right to be on the ballot,
nor his right to have information
distributed to the public. The court
stated that just as in Kaplan, the
Sample Ballot and Voter
Information Booklet provided only
one way for candidates to
communicate their qualifications to
the public and candidates are only
required to pay printing costs if they
choose to use that method. Based on
this reasoning, the court held that
the County's "wealth primary" did
not violate any fundamental rights
and, therefore, did not qualify for a
"heightened scrutiny analysis."
County Reimbursement
System Passed the Rational
Basis Test
Because the court found that the
County's "wealth primary" did not
burden a suspect class or a
fundamental right, the court
analyzed the County's judicial
election process using the "rational
basis" test. Under the "rational
basis" test, a state action is valid
when it is "rationally related to a
legitimate purpose." Here, the court
found that requiring candidates to
pay the costs of printing their
statements was rationally related to
the legitimate goals of having
candidates finance their own
campaigns and keeping down the
costs to the County. The court again
emphasized that printing statements
in the Ballot merely was one of
many methods of running a
campaign.
Without applying a "heightened
scrutiny analysis," the court found
that the County's judicial election
process was valid because neither
candidates nor voters have a
fundamental right to judicial
elections that are of equal access
with regard to wealth. The court
followed the Supreme Court, which
has refused to recognize that every
candidate has a right to an equal
chance of success in election
campaigns.
Annuity Investors Held to Obligations Under Their
Group Contracts
By Bonnie Katubig
In Otto v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 841 (7th Cir.
1998), the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the United
States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois by
holding that retirement annuity
companies are held strictly and
singly to the contractual obligations
they set forth in their group
contracts with their investors.
Furthermore, the court found that
challenges for breaches of contracts
to those obligations must be
supported fully in the contracts.
Retirement Investment
Program Detailed Through
Contracts
Beverly Otto and several teachers
("Plaintiffs') invested in retirement
accounts with Variable Annuity Life
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